US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
9-1-2007

China's Expansion into and U.S. Withdrawal from Argentina's
Telecommunications and Space Industries and the Implications
for U.S. National Security
Janie Hulse Ms

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Hulse, Janie Ms, "China's Expansion into and U.S. Withdrawal from Argentina's Telecommunications and
Space Industries and the Implications for U.S. National Security" (2007). Monographs, Books, and
Publications. 669.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/669

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO AND U.S.
WITHDRAWAL FROM ARGENTINA’S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE
INDUSTRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Janie Hulse

September 2007

Visit our website for other free publication downloads
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
To rate this publication click here.
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined
in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the
public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States
Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

*****
The views expressed in this report are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution
is unlimited.
*****
This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College
External Research Associates Program. Information on this program
is available on our website, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.
army.mil, at the Publishing button.
*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available
on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies
of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI's
homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail
newsletter to update the national security community on the
research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and
upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter
also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research
analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please
subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.
mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-307-8

ii

FOREWORD
The U.S. Government is waking up to China’s
growing presence in Latin America. For the last
several years as U.S. policymakers’ attention and
resources, largely diverted from Latin America, have
been focused on the Middle East, China has pursued
a policy of economic engagement with the region.
Sino-Latin American trade has sky-rocketed, and
Chinese investment in the region is picking up. In this
monograph, Ms. Janie Hulse, a Latin American specialist based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, argues that increased Chinese investment in regional telecommunications and space industries has implications for U.S. national security. She believes that globalization, advances
in information technology and China’s growing
capacity and interest in information warfare make
the United States particularly vulnerable. Ms. Hulse
details China’s expansion into and U.S. withdrawal
from these intelligence-related industries in Argentina
and highlights associated risks for the United States.
The author calls for the U.S. Government to react to this
current trend by increasing its engagement in regional
strategic industries and bettering relationships with its
southern neighbors.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
In April 2005 when the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee of the House International Relations
Committee met to discuss Chinese involvement in Latin
America, administration officials tended to downplay
Chinese engagement in the region except in areas
related to communications and intelligence. Indeed,
globalization, new technologies, and growing Chinese
information warfare capabilities make the United States
particularly vulnerable to Chinese activity in these
strategic areas. China’s recent success in Argentina’s
telecommunications and space industries exemplifies
China’s increasing effectiveness in strategic developing
markets and raises concerns regarding increasing U.S.
reliance on international information networks.
Chinese companies are aggressively positioning themselves for success in Argentina’s telecommunications industry. Relative to other developing
markets in Latin America, Argentina has a robust
telecommunications sector. In the 1990s, the sector
was privatized leading to a period of growth and modernization that was briefly offset by a deep economic
crisis in the country in 2002. Despite industry setbacks
associated with the crisis, Chinese companies fought
for a place in the market as many other international
companies were fleeing. U.S. companies like AT&T and
Bell South, that quickly set up operations after the 2000
privatization, for example, quickly exited Argentina at
the first signs of economic instability. Conversely, the
government-backed Chinese companies—Huawei and
ZTE—doubled their efforts to gain a foothold in the
floundering industry, only to receive dividends as the
economy picked up a few years later. These companies
v

first offered technology apt for rural developing
markets, then worked their way up the value chain to
become suppliers to the country’s two main monopolies
that operate networks in urban centers. As these
two Chinese telecommunications companies grow
in Argentina and across the region, U.S. companies
continue their retreat, preferring faster, safer returns in
developed markets.
At a time when the United States is distracted
from the Latin America region and is focusing less
attention on cooperation with regional governments,
Argentina, which has traditionally relied on U.S. space
cooperation, is reaching out to China to modernize
its space program. In the last few years, China has
pushed to become a player in Argentina’s space and
satellite industry. During President Hu Jintao’s visit to
Argentina in November 2004, the countries signed a
Framework Agreement on “Technology Cooperation
in the Peaceful Use of Outer Space,” whereby China
expressed willingness to provide Argentina with
commercial launch services, satellite components,
and communication satellite platforms. The Argentine
government—through its newly created state satellite
company, ARSAT—is taking advantage of China’s
offer to launch a satellite in the commercially valuable
81 degrees longitude slot, which allows observation of
all the Americas. Payment for services and equipment
provided by the Chinese will be made through ARSAT
stock, which would give the Chinese ownership stake
and corresponding voting rights in the Argentine state
satellite company. Moreover, the Chinese are interested
in assisting Argentina with the development and
fielding of low-orbiting, fixed observance satellites and
have already provided the South American country
with a third generation precision satellite laser ranger
(SLR).
vi

The implications for U.S. national security of
increasing Chinese presence in Argentine and other
regional telecommunications and space sectors
will depend on the U.S. response to this trend.
Potential threats exist as U.S. companies cede market
dominance to Chinese and other foreign companies
in strategically sensitive sectors. Telecommunications
networks are no longer domestic, terrestrial, and
circuit-switch operated. They are interdependent,
diverse, and rest on terrestrial, satellite, and wireless
technologies. These latter technologies are harder to
control and more susceptible to tampering and attacks.
Chinese capabilities in information technology and
information warfare are increasing as its economic and
political influence grow in Latin American countries.
If unchecked, the United States leaves itself vulnerable
to international information networks, which are
of increasing operational importance to a modern
military. Some of these international networks are now
being operated by Huawei, a Chinese company with
close ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Chinese presence in Western Hemisphere space
creates particular vulnerabilities for the United States.
Latin America’s geographical proximity makes for
convenient satellite observance of the United States.
Access to space tracking facilities in the region also could
give China the ability to attack U.S. satellites. Moreover,
Chinese space cooperation with Latin American
governments that have historically collaborated with
the United States provides the Chinese an opportunity
to study U.S. space technologies and practices up close.
As is the case with the telecommunications industry,
there is increasing competition in the international
space markets. If the United States fails to maintain its
preeminence in these markets, it will lose the ability to
secure this extremely strategic industry.
vii

While China is not currently building a significant
military presence in Latin America, the human and
commercial infrastructure that it is building in the
region increasingly gives China a powerful lever for
disrupting and distracting the United States in the
Western Hemisphere, should Sino-U.S. relations turn
sour. The United States should work to counter China’s
growing influence to mitigate future threats. To do so
requires improving U.S. relations with Latin American
countries and making U.S. companies more competitive
in the region—especially in strategic markets where
U.S. security is at stake. The most effective way for the
United States to improve its standing and influence in
Argentina and the Latin American region as a whole is
to help these countries succeed economically through
increased aid, trade, and investments. Aid should
be expanded in a creative, cost-effective manner and
should include middle-income countries in South
America, which traditionally do not qualify for U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID)
assistance. Free trade should continue to be promoted,
but in a more generous way. The U.S. Government
should promote investment by bolstering the U.S.
Commercial Service and assisting U.S. companies in
gaining a foothold in the strategic telecommunications
and space industries. It also behooves the U.S.
Government to increase assistance to and cooperation
with Latin American militaries to maintain friendships
throughout the region. It is not too late for the United
States to take remedial action to increase its presence in
Latin America’s telecommunications and space sectors.
Commercial and aid efforts should be complemented
by a heavy dose of improved public diplomacy—
especially in countries similar to Argentina where
U.S. popularity is low and where China has made
substantial inroads.
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CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO AND U.S.
WITHDRAWAL FROM ARGENTINA’S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE
INDUSTRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
Introduction.
Chinese involvement in the Latin American space
and telecommunication industries has implications for
U.S. National Security. Unlike other commercial activities geared toward supplying raw materials to China’s
1.3 billion inhabitants, Chinese investment in space and
telecommunications implies broader commercial and
strategic interests that potentially put the Chinese into
Western Hemisphere air and space. It is in the security
interest of the U.S. Government to understand Chinese
penetration into these intelligence-related industries in
Latin America and to adjust diplomatic and defense
policy accordingly in order to mitigate future threats.
Argentina, one of China’s “strategic partners” and the
third largest market in Latin America, makes a good
case study as China has already entered its space and
telecommunications sectors.
On April 6, 2005, the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee of the House International Relations
Committee held a hearing on Chinese involvement in
Latin America. At the hearing, administration officials
tended to downplay Chinese engagement in the
region except in areas related to communications and
intelligence. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Western Hemisphere Affairs Rogelio Pardo-Maurer
testified that the United States needs “to be alert to
rapidly advancing Chinese capabilities, particularly
1

in the field of intelligence, communications and cyber
warfare, and their possible application in the region.”
He maintained that the United States “would encourage
nations in the hemisphere to take a close look at how
such activities could possibly be used against them or
the United States.”1
The Chinese are long-term strategists who have
proven themselves competent in the area of information
technology. They are not averse to espionage,
and their current military doctrine emphasizes
Information Warfare (IW) as a means of overcoming
military power asymmetries. How they may use
their growing presence in Latin America’s space
and telecommunications sectors remains unknown,
but potential threats for the United States exist. It is
in the United States’ security interest to monitor the
expansion of Chinese involvement in the information
technology fields of space and telecommunications in
the Western Hemisphere. This monograph is an early
attempt to do just that. It explores China’s growing
presence in these strategic industries. It uses the case
of Argentina to highlight China’s aggressive approach
to business in the region, its recent and rapid success
and their implications for U.S. security.
As Chinese companies make inroads into Argentina’s telecommunications and space industries, U.S.
companies are retreating. Profit-seeking U.S. companies
have less staying power in volatile developing markets
than government-subsidized Chinese companies with
incentives for long-term success. This has implications
for U.S. security for a number of reasons. First, the
United States loses market share in strategic industries
and with it influence in Argentina. Secondly, the
United States loses the opportunity to exert control
over networks in Argentina and grows vulnerable
2

to the whims of local and foreign companies and the
Argentine government. Third, the void left by the U.S.
companies in these strategic industries is being filled
by state companies of a strategic adversary—China.
Fortunately, Chinese penetration into Argentina’s
telecommunications and space sectors is in a nascent
phase. There is still time to remedy this undesirable
trend found in Argentina and other Latin American
countries. Reenergizing U.S. telecommunications and
space initiatives in Argentina and Latin America as a
whole and improving U.S. standing and influence in
the region are of primary importance. Failure to act will
only tarnish the United States’ image further and leave
it vulnerable to foreign information systems in an era
when they are of utmost importance to U.S. national
security.
Argentina’s Telecommunications Sector.
Chinese companies are aggressively positioning
themselves for success in strategic industries of
developing economies. Over the next 10 years, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts the pace of
growth from emerging economies to be double that of
developed nations. Chinese companies doing business
outside of China are mostly state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) that are provided government incentives to
penetrate strategic industries in the developing world.
Unlike purely profit seeking U.S. companies, Chinese
SOEs, cushioned by generous lines of credit, are not
averse to entering into uneconomical deals. They tend
to be driven less by market and profit considerations
and more by their government’s strategy to establish
strategic footholds and lock up resources.2

3

The growing importance of developing economies
is especially evident in today’s telecommunications
industry. Mobile phone markets are saturated
in developed countries but growing strongly in
developing nations. The British arm of Gartner Group,
an international telecommunications research firm,
recommended that mobile-handset manufacturers
worldwide should be looking to emerging markets
for the bulk of their sales in the near future. While
there is concern that this will not translate directly into
high profits, Gartner reported that mobile phone sales
worldwide will reach 1 billion units by 2009.3 Chinese
companies are strategically focusing their foreign
investments in these growing markets.
Relative to other developing markets in Latin
America, Argentina has a robust telecommunications
sector. It is second only to Chile in the region for
cellular phone penetration and ranks in third place for
fixed line penetration after Puerto Rico and Uruguay.4
Argentina has a population of about 38 million, with
more than 32 million cellular phones and nearly 9
million fixed telephone lines in service.5 Internet is the
fastest growing telecommunications technology in the
country.6 Data from 2006 reveal more than 13 million
internet users in Argentina, which represents 34 percent
of the population.7 Argentina has the third largest
population of internet users in Latin America and is
one of the four main broadband leaders in the region
along with Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Projections from
December 2005 estimate a 100 percent annual growth
of broadband access.8
With increasing internet access, Argentina is quickly becoming more reliant upon Internet Protocol (IP)
communications. Considered an early adaptor of new
technologies, the Argentine communications market
4

will continue to experience significant IP expansion as
more businesses harness the potential of IP networks.
Even though it is still a nascent technology in the
country, a recent survey by Prince and Cooke of the
top 130 companies showed that the adoption of IP
telephony had already reached 20 percent by mid-2005,
from a mere 5 percent penetration in 2004. Argentina is
the leader in the adoption of IP telephony in the region
followed by Chile.9 Moreover, Argentina is following
the world trend of converging telecommunications
services over one multiservice network. This will leave
behind the outdated switching systems of the early
1990s.10
Argentina’s telecommunications sector went
through dramatic change in the 1990s as it was gradually privatized from an inefficient state-run sector. A
period of growth and modernization in the sector started
with the privatization of the state-owned telephone
company ENTEL in 1990. Basic telecommunications
services were privatized by splitting Entel in half and
creating two monopolies—one in the north of the
country owned by Telecom (French Telecom and a
Telecom Italia Consortium) and one in the south owned
by Spain’s Telefónica. After 10 years of gradual change,
the market was fully liberalized in November 2000.
Deregulation has opened up the market and created
fierce competition for new customers and new service
niches. New market entrants struggle against the
advantages of strong, already established players.11
The Argentine telecommunications sector has
shown significant investments and growth since
2004 after a period of contraction that began with the
country’s recession and financial crisis of 2000-02.
The sector grew 20 percent in 2005 and 19.5 percent
in 2006. Total sector revenues, including equipment
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and services, reached U.S. Dollars (USD) $5.1 billion in
2005 and USD $6.1 billion in 2006, surpassing pre-crisis
levels. The market is expected to continue growing by
20 percent in 2007 and 19 percent in 2008.12
The Chinese Enter Argentine Telecommunications.
There is substantial international interest in Argentina’s telecommunications industry owing largely
to deregulation, increasingly modern infrastructure,
and several years of solid growth. The Chinese have
managed to compete in this burgeoning market despite
economic setbacks and competition by larger, more
established companies. When Argentina’s financial
crisis hit in 2002, China quickly seized the chance to
increase its stake in the country as U.S. investment
declined by nearly half. During this economically
tumultuous period, the Chinese made inroads into
Argentina’s telecommunications sector. Two Chinese
telecommunications companies, in particular Huawei
and ZTE, quickly established a niche supplying hightech telephony suitable for rural and lesser developed
regions. These areas proved more penetrable as
the two dominant telecommunications companies
in Argentina—Telefónica and Telecom—operate
mostly in populated urban areas. Five years after the
crisis, Huawei and ZTE are established as important
equipment suppliers in the Argentine market. It is
likely that their presence in the market will grow, and
that they will upgrade their service offerings to include
networks as they have done in other South American
countries. In August 2006, for example, Brazil’s Vivo,
the biggest mobile telecommunications operator in the
southern hemisphere, chose Huawei as the key supplier
of the largest new GSM network in Latin America.13
6

Huawei arrived to Argentine in 2001 in the midst of
the economic crisis and by 2004 was bringing in revenues of USD $14 million. It has since replaced traditional equipment providers like Alcatel and Siemens in
the Argentine market, thanks to its aggressive commercial approach and low prices. Recently, Huawei invested
in a new plant in Buenos Aires Province aiming to
produce 100,000-400,000 wireless handsets per year for
sale throughout Latin America. Their Code Division
Multiple Access (CDMA) 450 Mhz equipment is apt for
long signal ranges in rural areas. As of September 2005,
Huawei’s telephone assembly takes place in a former
barracks at a military base in City Bell near La Plata,
the capital of Buenos Aires Province. Huawei supplies
the funds and the technology, and local telecom
cooperatives manufacture the equipment. The property
was ceded to the local cooperatives by the Argentine
Secretary of Communication. Part of the property is
still used by the Army’s Communication Battalion
601. Huawei invested USD $1 million to refurbish the
military facilities for its use. Huawei’s agreement with
the local cooperatives allows it to keep 35 percent of
the manufacturing facilities after 36 months.14
Chinese company ZTE, Huawei’s direct competitor,
has also successfully penetrated the Argentine
telecommunications market. ZTE has been heavily
involved with setting up a “wireless corridor” between
El Calafate and Perito Moreno in Argentina’s Patagonia
region.15 Working alongside a local cooperative,
ZTE has provided the technology for the necessary
installations free of charge.16 According to press reports,
ZTE has offered similar pro-bono work to several other
local governments throughout Argentina including
López Camelo, Villa Gesell, and Río Turbio. Huawei
had also offered to donate equipment to the Calafate
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project, but there was no need for the local cooperative
to accept its offer as it already possessed equipment
donated directly by the Chinese government.17 During
Argentine President Néstor Kirchner’s 2004 visit to
China, the Chinese government donated a network of
fixed cellular rural telephony for Calafate, providing
wireless connections within a 50 kilometer radius of a
fixed station and reducing the cost of telephone service
in rural areas.18
Huawei and ZTE are China’s two largest
telecommunications equipment and service suppliers.
They are capable of providing end-to-end solutions
to telecommunications carriers, and they have built
broad product portfolios. Both companies are based in
China’s Shenzhen region, one of the country’s “Special
Economic Zones” that provide tax incentives for
companies. Huawei and ZTE have both successfully
competed against dominant multinational players
in China’s domestic market and are now expanding
internationally by targeting underdeveloped, pricesensitive markets often skipped by major western
brands. Norson Telecom Consulting analyst Dave
Carini said that since ZTE and Huawei were little known
in western countries, developing markets offered the
best opportunity for overseas expansion. ZTE and
Huawei equipment typically costs 30 to 40 percent less
than similar gear sold by western suppliers, who are
reluctant to see their margins eroded by price cuts.
ZTE and Huawei are quickly gaining a reputation as
world-class suppliers and are up-and-coming players
in the international marketplace.
Huawei, a private company, was established in
Shezhen in 1987 with registered capital of only USD
$27,000. Now the company has total revenues of over
USD $6 billion. Since its founding, Huawei has grown
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quickly and now employs 30,000 people worldwide.
It is expanding internationally at an accelerated rate
with 65 percent of sales now emanating from overseas
markets. Huawei’s overseas sales increased from
USD $50 million in 1999 to USD $5 billion in 2005, a
hundred-fold growth within 6 years. Huawei has
established over 85 overseas branches, research centers
and factories, and has deployed wireless terminal
technologies in over 100 countries, providing services
for roughly 1 billion customers.19
In 2004, Huawei had revenues of 2 billion in Latin
America alone, where it now has offices in 13 countries.
As mentioned, VIVO, the largest mobile operator in the
region, adopted Huawei’s EnerG Group Special Mobile
(GSM) solutions in 2006 to build South America’s biggest mobile network along Brazil’s developed coastal
states, including Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Paraná,
Rio Grande do Sul, and Santa Caterina.20 In mid-2006,
Huawei was also awarded a Next Generation Network
(NGN) transformation contract worth more than USD
$50 million with CANTV, the leading provider of
telecommunications services in Venezuela.21 Less than
half a year later, in an effort to nationalize the strategic
industry, the Venezuelan government bought New
York-based Verizon’s 28.5 percent stake in CANTV
for USD $572 million.22 Venezuela is opening up its
telecommunications market to China as it shuts U.S.
companies out.
Much of Huawei’s overseas success is attributed
to the company penetrating rural, developing world
markets. Huawei is the number one producer of CDMA
450 Mgz rural telephony and holds 67 percent of the
world market share of the technology. According to Li
Cheng, Visiting Fellow at the John L. Thornton China
Center of the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC,
9

Huawei’s leadership has been inspired by Mao’s ideas
of “occupying the country-side first in order to encircle
the cities.”23 Indeed, Huawei got its start in China by
targeting markets in small cities and towns in remote
provinces, areas to which multinational companies
did not even bother to seek access.24 The company has
moved up the value-chain in its product and service
provision in China and is now following the same
successful formula overseas.
Huawei’s success is also attributed to support it
receives from the Chinese government, particularly
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Huawei’s chief
executive and one of the seven founders, Ren Zhengfie,
spent 10 years in the PLA, and Huawei is reported to
have installed switches and other telecommunications
equipment linking military bases across China in 2000.
The company plays down the role of the government
and the military in its contracts, yet Huawei receives
state support in the form of tax privileges and statesponsored credit because it has been designated
a “national champion” of new technology. For
example, the company was awarded a massive
financing agreement from the state-controlled China
Development Bank in December 2004. The agreement
establishes a USD $10 billion credit facility for Huawei
and its customers, acting as a government-backed
guarantee on international expansion.25
An unclassified Canadian intelligence report26 labels
Huawei a civilian defense enterprise that grew over the
years through PLA tutelage. In the 1980s, in order to
increase funds for the military, the Chinese army was
allowed to enter into profit-making businesses under
favorable tax and investment rules. By the mid-1990s,
the so-called PLA Inc. included over 20,000 companies
in areas such as agribusiness, electronics, tourism, and
10

telecommunications. In 1998, government leadership
ordered the PLA to divest itself of its profit-oriented
businesses because of concerns about corruption. The
PLA has not, however, completely withdrawn from
the economy nor have the divested firms completely
severed ties with the PLA. According to the report,
Huawei is one of many private companies involved in
defense production.
The same Canadian intelligence report claims
that Huawei has offices in rogue states like Cuba and
Iran and accuses the Chinese company of having
aided the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regime. In
2001, its Indian subsidiary was blamed for tailoring
a commercial order for the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Also in 2001, Huawei allegedly supplied Iraq with
fiber optics to link its radar and anti-aircraft systems.27
Huawei denied these accusations and explained that
its equipment was found in Iraq because it had won
a tender under the United Nations (UN) Oil-for Food
Program to build a GSM network, but gave up on the
project.28
The Indian government has been evaluating the
risks of exposing strategic telecommunications networks to Huawei for fear that China could attack India’s
communications networks should relations between
the countries deteriorate. The license in dispute would
allow Huawei’s India subsidiary, Huawei Technologies
India, to bid for installation and maintenance work,
among other types of telecommunications projects.29
According to a Times of India article in August 2005,
the dilemma facing the government involved a choice
“between cheap Chinese equipment and national
security.” The Indian defense ministry stated, “In
view of China’s focus on cyber warfare, there is a
risk of exposing our strategic telecom network to
11

the Chinese.” India’s security agency expressed
“reservations regarding the company’s links with
the Chinese military and intelligence establishment,
their clandestine operations in Iraq and Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan, and their close ties with the Pakistan
army.”30
Another more provocative press article in September
2006 warned India against “sleeping with the enemy.”
It highlights the PLA’s recent modernization efforts,
which have included “the wholesale shift to digital,
secure communications via fiber optic cable, satellite,
microwave, and encrypted high frequency radio.”
This military shift was made possible by what Rand
calls the “digital triangle,” an alliance among China’s
booming IT companies, state research and development
corporations, and the military. Under the triangle,
Chinese companies are called “national champions.”
They are allowed generous lines of credit from state
banks and funding and staff from the military and
state research institutions. The PLA is the most favored
customer for the high technology made by the “national
champions” like Huawei.31
ZTE, a publicly listed company, was founded
in 1985 in Shenzhen by a handful of state-owned
companies affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of
Aerospace Industry. ZTE became a publicly listed
company in 1997 and has gained credit from analysts
and customers alike for being more transparent than
the privately held Huawei. Nonetheless, despite its
listing, the Chinese government still owns a big portion
of ZTE’s shares.32
ZTE is already China’s second-biggest telecommunications equipment vendor, after rival Huawei,
and China’s largest listed telecommunications solutions
provider. The company has grown along with China’s
12

big phone companies, which are ZTE’s top customers.
ZTE’s revenue reached USD $2.68 billion in 2005.
More than 25 percent of ZTE’s business comes from
international markets, and the company is actively
focused on expanding overseas sales. ZTE expects that
more than 50 percent of its revenue will come from the
international market by 2008.
ZTE has been successful in the Asian and African
markets and is now making inroads into Latin America
where its revenues reached USD $400 million in 2005.33
In May 2004, ZTE signed a USD $100 million contract to
supply CDMA handsets to Vivo in Brazil. The Chinese
company, like its rival Huawei, has focused energies
on rural areas in the Latin American market where big
multinationals dominate the populous urban areas.
ZTE’s Chief Executive officer (CEO), Yin Yimin, says
the company is able to prevail over bigger competitors
in developing markets because its home base in China
gives it a better understanding of how to operate in
developing countries. According to Business Week
Online, Yimin is one of a new breed of bosses within
China’s state-owned enterprises. “He is keenly aware
of how competitive the industry is, doesn’t take state
support for granted, and thinks about business as a
constant battle.”34
Both Huawei and ZTE are making their mark in
the world’s telecommunications industry, with the
former raising alarm bells for its connection with the
PLA. Both companies benefit from China’s increasing
supply of highly skilled, cheap labor and the
world’s—especially the developing world’s—hunger
for reasonably priced high-quality technology. The
companies are also able to leverage their experience
in China’s expansive developing world market in
other emerging markets. Andrew Chetham, an analyst
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with Gartner Inc. in Hong Kong, believes Huawei
and ZTE could potentially change the structure of the
telecommunications industry. He said, “In 5 years’
time, western companies [won’t be able to] keep up
with their research and development spending because
of their low-cost advantage.”35 In fact, some analysts
believe that the recent merger and acquisition deals
between Ericsson and Marconi, Alcatel and Lucent,
and Nokia and Siemens were at least partly designed
to fight off competition from Huawei and ZTE.36
Part of Huawei and ZTE’s successful international
expansion is owed to their aggressive approach to
business. In Argentina, their style has been described
as ruthless. They are known to bribe and “trap” clients.
They frequently offer Argentine clients and prospective
clients full-paid trips to China. Upon arrival, it is alleged
that they are presented with an envelope containing
a significant amount of cash. Industry analyst Carlos
Blanco disclosed one known case where, after a day
of sightseeing, the Chinese left photos of their guests
taken while touring in their hotel rooms. According to
Blanco, such behavior is frowned upon by Argentine
businessmen and is seen as a form of extortion.37
Blanco views Huawei as the more ruthless of the two
companies. He explains that Huawei is known for
its cunning tactics of roping in clients. It often lends
its equipment for trial periods, but if the prospective
client does not wish to make a purchase after the trial,
the Chinese company backtracks, claiming that it
must charge for the use of the equipment. Uruguay’s
state telephone operator ANTEL purportedly fell into
this trap. Huawei had offered ANTEL a 1-year trial
of third generation telephone radios. After the trial
period, ANTEL dragged its feet about purchasing the
expensive, high-tech equipment, but Huawei insisted.
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ANTEL bought the equipment even though the
marketplace did not warrant it.38
While they are the dominant players, Huawei and
ZTE are not the only Chinese companies in Argentina’s
telecommunications sector. Hutchison Whampoa
Limited, a Hong-Kong based holding company
rumored to have ties to Chinese leadership and the
PLA, also has a stake in the market. Hutchinson’s
diverse array of holdings include, but are not limited to,
the world’s biggest port operators, retailers, property
development and infrastructure companies, and
telecommunications operators. Hutchinson operates
telecommunications businesses in Europe, Hong Kong,
and various emerging markets. The conglomerate has
been particularly successful in India where it owns 67
percent of the mobile phone business.39 In Argentina,
Hutchinson operates a telecommunications network
called “Port-hable” in the western part of Buenos Aires
Province. It is a fixed line service but acts as a mobile
service as customers can receive the signal outside
of their homes. Hutchinson has about 70,000 users in
Argentina. It wants a license to expand into the mobile
market, but the Argentine Communications Secretariat
denied its petition in January 2006. The government
favored a local Argentine cooperative for the space.40
Hutchinson, which has raised concern among U.S.
politicians for its operation of strategic ports at each
end of the Panama Canal, also runs a state-of-the-art
container terminal in the Port of Buenos Aires.41
The two big telecommunications monopolies in
Argentina—Telefónica and Telecom—are contributing
to the rise of Chinese telecommunications companies.
Both companies buy equipment from Huawei and
ZTE, and both have other deepening ties with China. In
July 2005, Telefónica International broke into China’s
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state-run telecommunications sector by agreeing to
pay USD $290 million for 2.99 percent stake in China
Netcom, China’s second-largest fixed-line operator.
In September 2005, the company bought another
2.01 percent for USD $242 million, lifting its stake to
the maximum 5 percent and qualifying for a seat on
the board.42 While the transaction was carried out by
Telefónica Spain, according to a journalist at Xinhau
news agency in Buenos Aires, the investment funds
were provided by Telefónica Argentina. Netcom and
Telefónica are expected to cooperate on equipment
purchasing, research and development, marketing,
and business strategies.43 According to industry
analyst Carlos Blanco, it was the Chinese company
who sought out the partnership with Telefónica. China
Netcom is interested in extending its geographical
operations of fixed and mobile services.44 Also, it
is rumored that Telefónica is strategically aligning
itself with the Chinese so as to beat out potential
competition. Telecom Argentina also has developed
close ties with the Chinese. The Werthein family, which
together with Telecom Italia owns over 50 percent of
Telecom Argentina, was one of the first in Argentina
to do business with the Chinese beginning in the 1970s.
Since then, they have maintained good relations with
the Chinese. In fact, the patriarch of the family, Julio
Werthein, is the current President of the ArgentineChina Chamber of Commerce.45
Now deregulated, Argentina’s telecommunications
sector is undergoing continuous change associated
with increased competition, mergers, acquisitions, and
shifting strategic alliances. New entrants like Chinese
companies Huawei and ZTE have faired well and are
even beating out more experienced competitors for
market share. They have also garnered the support of the
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market’s dominant players—Telefónica and Telecom—
which now buy their equipment. Beyond Huawei and
ZTE, Telefónica and Telecom continue to strengthen
ties with the Chinese. Positive market conditions and
good relationships are helping the Chinese succeed
as equipment suppliers and increasingly as network
providers in Argentina and elsewhere in Latin
America. While viewed as competent and successful,
these largely state-owned companies’ past dealings,
motivations, and business practices are increasingly
called into question.
China Enters Argentine Space Operations.
China has been pushing for increased international
space cooperation and is looking to expand its share of
the international market for satellite launches and other
space services. Jin Zhuanglong, Deputy Director of
the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry
for National Defense, speaking at an international
conference on the space industry in Beijing in August
2006, mentioned that China will strengthen cooperation
in the international space community with the aim of
achieving “the peaceful development of outer space.”
China has already signed 16 agreements with 13
governments and organizations, and established space
industry cooperation with more than 40 countries and
international bodies. Specifically, China is looking
to further cooperation with European and South
American countries.46
Argentina and most other Latin American countries
have historically relied on cooperation with the United
States to support their space programs. Argentina
opened the door to increased space cooperation in 1991
when it created the Argentine National Commission on
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Space Activities (CONAE). Its first cooperative efforts
were with the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). The same year CONAE was
created, it signed an agreement with NASA for the
promotion of civilian space research and cooperation.
(An agreement extending the 1991 agreement was
signed in 1996.) Since then, cooperative activities
have included scientific exchanges, the launching by
NASA of Argentine scientific satellites, and a 1997
U.S.-Argentine space conference hosted by CONAE
and NASA. In addition, the U.S. and Argentina have
worked closely on the Gemini and Auger projects, two
multinational space programs.47
In 2000, the United States assisted Argentina in
launching its first Earth orbiting SAC-C satellite. The
project was a collaborative effort between Argentina,
the United States, Brazil, Denmark, France, and Italy.
The satellite was launched from Vandenberg Air Force
Base in California.48 Moreover, CONAE and NASA
are currently collaborating on the SAC-D/Aquarius
satellite, under construction by the Argentine hightech firm INVAP, which is scheduled for launch in
2008.49 U.S. private companies have also played a role
in the development of Argentina’s satellite program.
For example, General Electric Capital Corporation
(GE), later to be acquired by SES Global and become
SES Americom, was one of the early investors, with
28 percent of shares in Nahuelsat, a private company
created to operate satellite communications systems in
orbital positions assigned to Argentina.
In the last few years, China has pushed to become
a player in Argentina’s space and satellite industry as
well. During President Hu Jintao’s visit to Argentina
in November 2004, the countries signed a Framework
Agreement on “Technology Cooperation in the Peaceful
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Use of Outer Space.” According to the agreement, the
Chinese government is willing to provide the Argentine
government with commercial launch services, satellite
components, and communication satellite platforms.
The Argentine government is taking advantage of this
offer so as to launch a satellite in the commercially
valuable 81 degrees longitude slot, which allows for
observation of all the Americas.
The 81 degrees slot was allotted to the Argentine
government by the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) in 1998. It occupies a strategic orbital
position 36,000 kilometers above the equator, with a
reach to North America, including all of the United
States and the southern part of Canada. To date, the
government has been unable to launch a satellite into
the slot. The Argentine government had originally
commissioned the work to Nahuelsat, but financial
issues impeded its success in filling the 81 degrees
slot. There is pressure mounting for the Argentine
government to fill the slot, and it has already asked for
extensions to the original deadline of October 2003 and
the extended deadline of October 2005 imposed by the
ITU. At present, the government is enjoying a de-facto 2year grace period until the World Telecommunications
Conference in October 2007, after which the ITU will
decide on its case.
In 2004, the Argentine government promoted the
creation of ARSAT, a national satellite company, to
be responsible for placing a satellite into Argentina’s
81 degrees slot and repairing its older satellite, Nahuel
1, now occupying position 72 West. The ARSAT
program was approved by the Argentine Senate in
September 2004 and was signed into existence by the
Congress in March 2006. The company was assigned
an initial 50 million pesos (roughly USD $16.6 million)
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from the government, with the rest of the needed
capital to be generated by stock sales. Large and
small telecommunications companies in Argentina
had promised the government that they would buy
capacity once the satellite was up and running. In
December 2005, Nahuelsat was reorganized due to the
withdrawal of SES Americom, and it was decided that
the company will be absorbed into ARSAT, leaving
only one satellite operator in Argentina.
INVAP, a space satellite manufacturing company
run by the Argentine Province Rio Negro, will be
responsible for creating and launching the satellite
for ARSAT. In 2004, during his visit to Latin America,
Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the INVAP facility
in Rio Negro.50 In May 2005, the Chinese government
signed an agreement with the Argentine government
to provide technical support and equipment to INVAP
for the development of the satellite. According to
industry experts, INVAP does not have the capability
to build a communications satellite on its own. Chinese
experience and expertise will complement INVAP’s
capabilities. The Chinese also have offered Argentina
a full launching system for the satellite at a 30 percent
discount from international market prices. Payment
for services and equipment provided by the Chinese
will be paid through ARSAT stock, which would
give the Chinese ownership stake and corresponding
voting rights in the Argentine state satellite company.51
According to one press report, there are conversations
going on between the Argentine and Venezuelan
governments about the possibility of Venezuela joining
the ARSAT project.52
Chinese space assistance to Argentina goes beyond
the high-profile slot 81. Indeed, according to industry
analyst Carlos Blanco, China is largely interested in
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low orbiting, fixed observance satellites in Argentina.
Argentina already has two in place, and China is
interested in helping Argentina develop and field more.
Moreover, in early 2006, China provided Argentina
with a third generation precision satellite laser ranger
(SLR). According to press reports, the astronomical
instrument was installed in San Juan University of
Argentina, and will be launched jointly by China
National Astronomical Observatories (NAOC) and
Argentine San Juan University. The primary function
of the SLR is the measurement of precise distances
between laser telescopes and reflectors on passing
satellites. SLR is mainly used in monitoring earth
rotation and polar motion, modeling the temporal and
spatial variation of the earth’s gravity field, and the
determination of ocean and earth tides.53
China’s space cooperation in South America
extends beyond Argentina. For example, China has
signed a contract to manufacture and launch satellites
for Venezuela, and has cooperated with Brazil on the
development and launch of four satellites under the
China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS) program.
The CBERS program involves, among other things,
Brazilian digital imaging technology that may help the
Chinese to augment their over-the-horizon military
targeting capability.54 Brazilian space cooperation
with China is more advanced than Argentina-China
cooperation. According to Stephen Johnson, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere
Affairs who works for the Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy, the Chinese began collaborating with
Brazil on spy satellite technology in 1999, providing
rocket launch expertise in exchange for digital optical
technology that would permit high resolution, realtime imaging.55
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The United States has a good track record of space
cooperation with Argentina dating back to the early
1990s. However, the 2005 withdrawal of SES-Americom
from Nahuelsat means that the United States will not
participate in the operation of Argentina’s two orbital
slots allotted to it by the ITU. Argentina’s state-run
company ARSAT will now be the sole operator of the
slots. Moreover, China will be providing ARSAT’s
satellite manufacturer INVAP, another state company,
the technical assistance needed to create the satellite
that will eventually fill the 81 degrees position.
Argentina’s historic reliance on U.S. space
cooperation is waning as China offers alternative
assistance. This is part of a larger pattern best described
by Latin America scholar Peter Hakim as U.S. disinterest
post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), and resulting in
sporadic and narrowly targeted policies toward the
region since then. As a result, Latin American leaders’
support for Washington’s policies has diminished.
According to Hakim, few Latin Americans today, in
or out of government, consider the United States to be
a dependable partner.56 It is not surprising, then, that
they are reaching out to other willing partners like
China in areas such as space operations.
Implications for U.S. Security.
The implications for U.S. national security of
increasing Chinese presence in Argentine and other
regional space and telecommunications sectors will
depend on the U.S. response to this trend. Potential
threats exist as U.S. companies cede market dominance
to Chinese and other foreign companies in strategically
sensitive sectors. Telecommunications networks are
no longer domestic, terrestrial, and circuit-switch
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operated. They are interdependent, diverse, and rest
on terrestrial, satellite, and wireless technologies.
These latter technologies are harder to control and
more susceptible to tampering and attacks. Chinese
capabilities in information technology and IW are
increasing as its economic and political influence grows
in Latin American countries. If Chinese influence
is left unchecked, the United States will leave itself
vulnerable to international information networks,
which are of increasing operational importance to a
modern military.
Ceding Commercial Dominance.
According to a report written by Robert Fonow
in 2006 for the Center for Technology and National
Security Policy,57 it is expected that within 5 to 10
years, the United States will be only one of several
regional telecommunications centers, and not
necessarily the most powerful and influential. U.S.
leadership in telecommunications has experienced
a relative decline, with countries like China well
positioned to challenge current U.S. dominance in the
industry. Rather than a global integrated system, the
international telecommunications system, including
the Internet, email, and other applications, relies on a
physical set of private networks owned by businesses
and governments within sovereign states.
The United States used to be the undisputed leader
in international telecommunications operations and innovations with more influence internationally, but U.S.
telecommunications companies have retreated from
the ownership of fundamental international network
assets. U.S. leadership is particularly threatened in the
telecommunications technologies that make up the
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underlying routing and protocol fabric of the Internet.
Countries capable of challenging the United States
have invested heavily in networks. China in particular
has a network infrastructure that is as good in its
critical cores as the current U.S. telecommunication
system and shows every possibility of surpassing it in
the coming years.58
Fonow explains that U.S. companies’ retreat from
active ownership of international telecommunications
networks is not simply a matter of ceding commercial
dominance; it has implications for modern U.S.
military operations as well. In periods of high traffic,
which often accompany a crisis, it is estimated that up
to 90 percent of Department of Defense (DOD) traffic is
carried on networks owned and maintained by entities
in other countries.59 As a result, Fonow believes these
countries have the capacity to inhibit or disrupt U.S.
telecommunications outside U.S. borders at any time.60
He laments that U.S. citizens tend to think the United
States drives events, yet U.S. Government perceptions
and actions have been largely irrelevant to China’s
takeover of the international telecommunications
industry.61
The perception that the United States is still the
global telecommunications leader is dangerous insofar
as U.S. defense planners fail to accurately assess
China’s future military capabilities. With the ability to
collect and share information a vital part of any modern
military, China’s capacity to improve the PLA in this
area must be considered. China and other countries are
in the process of taking the lead in several technologies
that are critical to telecommunications-based warfare.
Fonow states:
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In telecommunications-based warfare, where the battlespace includes the international telecommunications
network, traditional military tactics become dependent
on the switches, routers, and software algorithms that
provide direction and intelligence. When the technology
and software algorithms belong to China, the rules of
the game change. This obvious fact is not understood
very well, or perhaps is just not acknowledged.
The emerging reliance on international networks in
military operations should thus be considered very
carefully. The United States no longer has control of
the international telecommunications system in any
essential or meaningful way, especially outside the
continental United States. The United States only has the
use of the international telecommunications network for
military purposes in any country at the pleasure of the
host government. Most Department of Defense (DOD)
traffic crosses other national networks, including those of
every potential adversary. Foreign nationals control U.S.
military information once it leaves the United States.62

Chinese companies are now formidable competitors
in the world’s telecommunications markets. They
are making impressive gains in developing world
markets where their low price technologies beat out
the competition. Moreover, the developing world
governments often prefer to deal with the Chinese.
China can bargain on the spot without a lot of caveats.
Its transactions are based on simple exchanges. Its
leaders have broad authority to negotiate foreign deals
without worrying about legislative oversight, the rule
of law, or altruistic objectives. Unlike western company
executives, Chinese leaders represent state monopolies
that mesh well with Latin American government
management of the telecommunications industry.
Moreover, authoritarian leaders and corrupt oligarchies
control a number of governments. For them, signing
purchase agreements with the Chinese is much easier
than dealing with the array of private corporations
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from more democratic countries.63 Moreover, Chinese
companies enter these developing markets for the long
term. Buffered by generous government credit lines,
they do not feel the same urgency to make a profit.
As Chinese companies gain strategic footholds
in the developing world, U.S. firms are withdrawing
from these places, preferring quick returns in more
developed markets. Fernando Guerrero, Vice President
of Nextel Argentina, believes that this is the case
for U.S. firms in Argentina. He explained that U.S.
telecommunications companies tend to be so driven
by quarterly results and resulting stock fluctuations
that they give up on markets that do not provide quick
returns. In Argentina, for example, U.S. companies that
lined up to enter the market just prior to deregulation
of the telecommunications industry in 2000 have
already bailed, unable or unwilling to weather the
storm of Argentina’s economic downturn in 2001-02.
AT&T and Bell South set up operations in Argentina
prior to deregulation in 2000, and both companies
have left already. Telmex acquired AT&T Latin
America, including AT&T Argentina, and Telefónica
bought Bell South Latin America’s assets, significantly
strengthening its position in the region.
Nextel is now the only U.S. telecommunications
company with robust operations in Argentina. Yet
Nextel does not work within the consumer market,
rather it is a niche player offering radio-operator
technology to businesses and government agencies.
When the crisis hit Argentina, Nextel already had an
investment of USD $600 million at stake in the country.
It kept operating through the dark days of economic
turmoil, and today it has investments totaling about 1
billion dollars.64
Besides Nextel, there is virtually no U.S. stake in
the Argentine telecommunications industry. This
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leaves it an open playing field for other national and
international players and creates vulnerabilities for
U.S. security. As the U.S. withdraws from the market,
it loses an opportunity to participate in securing the
industry. The U.S. Government and U.S. companies
rely on local networks for overseas operations. If there
are no U.S. service providers and network operators,
the United States is fully dependent on foreigners for
its communication. In the case of conflict, the United
States would have little recourse to protect vital lines
of communication.
Newer Technologies Create Vulnerabilities.
According to the U.S. National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee,65 the
impact of today’s technological environment is
profound. New technologies and the increasingly
competitive marketplace combine to bring both new
opportunities and new vulnerabilities to the information infrastructure. Thirty years ago, communications
services were provided by a communications
infrastructure based on a domestic, terrestrial, circuitswitched voice network, supported primarily by
manual controls. Today’s communications network
is composed of interdependent, diverse, circuit and
packet switched networks using terrestrial, satellite,
and wireless transmissions systems to provide voice,
data, image, and video communications, supported
primarily by software-based controls.
Globalization introduces another element of
diversity and interdependence as domestic service
providers establish joint ventures or merge with
foreign service providers. Communications networks
and information systems have inextricably converged
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into an information infrastructure in which neither
communications nor information processing can
fully function without the other. This growth and
convergence have offered capabilities and applications
that have profoundly changed how both the public
and private sectors conduct business, increasing
their dependence on the technologies comprising
the information infrastructure. While it is critical to
the U.S. Government, the information infrastructure
in the United States is owned and operated by the
private sector. This is not entirely true in China where,
despite major privatization over the last decade, the
Chinese government maintains strong control over
the industry. The Chinese, for example, do not allow
foreign companies to operate information networks in
China.
In today’s interconnected and increasingly
networked world, societies and their governments
are vulnerable to a wide variety of threats, including
deliberate attacks on critical information infrastructure.
The United States is especially at risk as it relies
heavily on computer and networked systems. Further,
as an open society where critical infrastructures are
controlled by independent nongovernmental entities
and where some critical military systems depend on
independently operated critical infrastructure, the
potential vulnerability of the United States to cyber
attack is huge.66
The Internet and related technologies are being
used to facilitate acts that could adversely impact
national security. Evidence suggests that attacks on
critical communication infrastructure are growing.
Cyber threats now are growing at a pace that exceeds
governments’ ability to address them. Safety and
security on the Internet is a national security issue. The
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Internet is a major component of the U.S. economy and a
communications tool for both government and military
messages.67 According to an August 2005 computer
security report by IBM, more than 237 million overall
security attacks were reported globally during the first
half of 2005. Government agencies were targeted the
most, reporting more than 54 million attacks. The most
frequent targets for these attacks were government
agencies and industries in the United States. U.S.
DOD officials acknowledged that hackers, apparently
based in China, have been successfully penetrating
U.S. military networks since 2001, and perhaps earlier.
Although the hackers are suspected to be based in
China, DOD and security officials remain divided
over whether the ongoing attacks are coordinated or
sponsored by the Chinese government.68
A 2004 survey by Counterpane Internet Security,
covering 450 networks in 35 countries, shows that
hacking has now become a profitable criminal pursuit.
Hackers now sell unknown computer vulnerabilities on
the black market to criminals who use them for fraud.69
A February 2005 report by the President’s Information
Technology Committee stated that the information
technology infrastructure of the United States, which is
vital for communication, commerce, and control of the
physical infrastructure, is highly vulnerable to terrorist
and criminal attacks. A May 2005 report by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated that
because of the growing sophistication of malicious
code on the Internet, the federal government may be
increasingly limited in its ability to respond to cyber
threats.70
The trend toward wireless technologies in the
telecommunications industry makes the industry
increasing vulnerable to tapping and manipulations.
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Wireless interception devices pick up waves easier
than having to physically tap a cable line. Again, if
U.S. companies can exert some control over wireless
networks, there are better chances of safeguarding
official U.S. communication. When these networks
are controlled by foreign nations or companies, U.S.
communications can never be 100 percent secure.
Telecommunications systems rest on fragile
infrastructure that can be crashed by anyone with
a serious intention to do so. National governments
can deny their networks to U.S. use, and vulnerable
network points could be easily located and destroyed
by any organization or state adversary with its own
telecommunications infrastructure.71 John Lowry,
an information security specialist, claims that all
countries need to be careful of anyone operating their
telecommunications infrastructure. Governments
should make sure that the companies’ interests match
the governments’ interests. Countries should be
aware of the source of equipment, software, and other
products that they purchase and understand who could
potentially tamper with them. According to Lowry, it
has to be tempting for any country to include a control
button or some sort of devise in the equipment they
sell that provides shut-down capabilities. Lowry
explains that there is particular distrust of Chinese
telecommunications companies owing to the PLA’s
role in the industry.72
China’s Growing Information Warfare Capabilities.
In 1999, two senior colonels of the PLA, Qiao Liang
and Wang Xiangsui, wrote a book on military strategy
entitled in English “Unrestricted Warfare.” In it, they
discuss innovative forms of warfare where new concept
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weapons take center stage and there is nothing in the
world that cannot be used as a weapon. They encourage
China to overcome traditional military asymmetries
with powers like the United States by placing new
emphasis on IW methods such as attacking enemy
financial markets, civilian electricity networks, and
telecommunications networks.73
A report written in 2001 by Dr. Toshi Yoshihara,74
professor in the Strategy and Policy Department
at the U.S. Naval War College, confirms China’s
interest in IW. Having reviewed Chinese literature
and debates, Yoshihara concludes that the Chinese
have demonstrated an intense fascination with IW.
Yoshihara uncovered a definition of IW provided by
Major General Wang Pufeng, widely recognized as the
founder of Chinese IW. According to the General,
Information war is a product of the information age
which to a great extent utilizes information technology
and information ordnance in battle. It constitutes a
“networkization” (wangluohua)of the battlefield, and a
new model for a complete contest of time and space. At
its center is the fight to control the information battlefield,
and thereby to influence or decide victory or defeat.75

One way to succeed in IW, according to Yoshihara,
is by implementing a Computer Network Attack (CNA).
CNA is the use of computers and telecommunications
equipment to disrupt, deny, degrade, and destroy
enemy computers, computer networks, and the
information being transmitted. One Chinese article
reviewed by Yoshihara noted that the information
technology revolution is the core and foundation of
this military revolution, because “information and
knowledge have changed the previous practice of
measuring military strength by simply counting the
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number of armored divisions, air force wings, and
aircraft carrier battle groups. Nowadays, one must take
into account some invisible forces, such as computing
capabilities, communications capacity, and system
reliability.”76
China is expanding cyber related military training
and is already incorporating cyber warfare into
military exercises. An article published in 2000 in the
Liberation Army Daily, the official newspaper of the
Chinese PLA, discusses Chinese preparations to carry
out high-technology warfare over the Internet and
advocates the creation of a fourth branch of the armed
services within the PLA devoted to IW.77 Moreover, a
Chinese presidential decree in year 2000 established
a military university whose mission includes training
soldiers in IW, among other communications-related
fields.78 Cyber warfare is an extreme example, but one
cannot discount it as a potential threat to U.S. national
security.
Growing out of a need to control the free flow
of information domestically, China has developed
impressive capabilities with the Internet. The Chinese
“Internet Policy,” officially known as the Ministry of
Public Security’s Internet and Security Supervision
Bureau, is reportedly more than 300,000 people strong.
Its Beijing branch proudly claimed that, in 2002 it
participated in a multiagency exercise to rid the Internet
of “harmful content” within 48 hours of the onset of an
emergency. They surpassed expectations by removing
the harmful content in 19 hours.79 Information security
specialist John Lowry agrees that China has good
practice in controlling the Internet, but its strength
has yet been tested as Internet penetration in China
remains limited; the Chinese may not have similar
successes as the scale of Internet use increases, which
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it surely will.80 Nonetheless, China appears to maintain
a tight grip on Internet content and its number of users
as of April 2006 stood at 200 million, higher than the
154 million U.S. users.81
Chinese in Western Hemisphere Space.
As the Chinese gain a foothold in the international
telecommunications industry, they are simultaneously
working to enter international space programs. The
United States already has reason to be wary of how the
Chinese may use their increased presence in Western
Hemisphere space against it. According to former U.S.
Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly, “[T]he facts are
that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations
against us, they make open statements against us, their
high-level documents show that they are not friendly
to us.” Chinese military white papers promote power
projection and describe U.S. policies as “hegemonism
and power politics.”82
China has already been caught spying on the United
States. In 1999, through collaboration with Fidel Castro,
China was reportedly intercepting satellite signals from
facilities in eastern Cuba. In 2000, it obtained access to
a base outside of Havana to intercept U.S. telephony.
In 2001, Russia announced that it would abandon
its extensive electronic espionage center at Lourdes,
Cuba. Chinese personnel reportedly now occupy it. A
February 2004 agreement cloaks such operations under
the pretext of technical communications cooperation. In
fact, Radio China International signals originate from
Cuba, as does interference with U.S. East Coast radio
communications and air traffic control, according to
Federal Communications Commission complaints.83
According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
33

Stephen Johnson, China has an eye trained on the
United States. U.S. intelligence agencies are aware of
this, but Washington’s penchant for focusing on one
threat at a time, such as the war on terrorism, could
leave the United States vulnerable to Chinese industrial
and military espionage.84
China’s space capabilities are on the rise as
evidenced by its recent antisatellite missile test. In
January 2007, China successfully destroyed one of
its own orbiting satellites with a ballistic missile. The
test of an antisatellite weapon was perceived by Asia
specialists as China’s most provocative military action
since it test fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan more
than a decade ago. The test spurred controversy with
analysts questioning China’s peaceful rise. “This is
the other face of China, the hard-power side, that they
usually keep well hidden,” said Chong-Pin Lin, an
expert in Taiwan on China’s military. “They talk more
about peace and diplomacy, but the push to develop
lethal, high-tech capabilities has not slowed down at
all.”85 The test makes China the third power to shoot
down an object in space, after the United States and
the former Soviet Union. Having a weapon that can
disable or destroy satellites is considered a component
of China’s unofficial doctrine of asymmetrical warfare.
China’s army strategists have written that in the event
of armed conflict with the United States, over Taiwan
for example, the Chinese military intends to rely on
relatively inexpensive but highly disruptive technology
to impede the better-equipped and better-trained U.S.
forces.
Chinese presence in Western Hemisphere space
creates particular vulnerabilities for the United States.
Latin America’s geographical proximity makes for
convenient satellite observance of the United States.
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Access to space tracking facilities in the region also
could give China the ability to attack U.S. satellites.86
Moreover, Chinese space cooperation with Latin
American governments that have historically
collaborated with the United States provides
the Chinese an opportunity to study U.S. space
technologies and practices up close. As is the case with
the telecommunications industry, there is increasing
competition in the international space markets. If the
United States fails to maintain its preeminence in these
markets, it will lose the ability to secure this extremely
strategic industry.
China’s Influence Grows as U.S. Influence Wanes.
China’s growing influence in Latin America
is owed largely to increased Sino-Latin American
economic ties dominated largely by trade. However,
it is also attributed to increasing political and military
cooperation between China and Latin American
countries. As U.S. influence in the region—especially
in South America—is waning, China’s influence grows.
When considering security vulnerabilities in areas like
telecommunications and space, good relations with
host governments become critical. U.S. decreasing
influence in the region, therefore, creates new security
vulnerabilities.
For the last several years as U.S. policymakers’
attention and resources focused on the Middle East and
largely diverted from Latin America, China has broken
with past precedent and pursued a policy of economic
engagement with the region. Sino-Latin American trade
reached USD $50 billion in 2005, with China emerging
as the region’s third largest trading partner. Latin
American exports to China are growing at 47 percent
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a year, with Mercosur’s original member countries—
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay—accounting
for 85 percent of the total.87 Two-way China-Latin
America trade is expected to reach USD $100 billion
by 2010. For purposes of comparison, U.S.-Latin America trade currently stands at USD $183 billion.88
Trade is the principle source of increased SinoLatin American ties, but economic investment and
cooperation also contribute to growing relations. During
his well-publicized trip to the region in November
2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao signed about 400
agreements and business deals89 with Latin American
countries and pledged that China would invest more
than USD $100 billion in the region over the next
decade. In the case of Argentina, USD $20 billion was
promised for investment in the country’s railways, oil
and gas exploration, construction, and communications
satellites. Moreover, five agreements were signed
increasing Argentine-Chinese bilateral cooperation
in the fields of space technology, education, tourism,
railways, and trade. Both the cooperative agreements
and investment promises are part of a larger “strategic
partnership” that has prompted increased collaboration
in commercial as well as noncommercial areas.
The U.S. Government is now alert to China’s
growing presence in the region. In April 2006, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs Thomas Shannon traveled to Beijing to talk
to Chinese government officials about their dealings
with the region. This was an unprecedented meeting,
highlighting China’s growing presence in the region.
According to Dr. Evan Ellis, a specialist in Latin
American and U.S. security issues, the trip can be
interpreted as a symbolic gesture recognizing China’s
“seat at the table.”90 According to the press, Army
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General Bantz J. Craddock, who at the time oversaw
U.S. Southern Command, prompted the high-level
discussions when he told a Senate Armed Services
Committee that “more and more Chinese nonlethal
equipment” was showing up in the region, and that
growing numbers of Latin American military officers
were going to China for training. During Assistant
Secretary Shannon’s visit, Chinese analysts explained
that their nation’s expanded military relations with
Latin America are part of its growing political,
economic, diplomatic, and military ties around the
world.91
U.S. policy has inadvertently strengthened China’s
role in military cooperation with the region with its
American Service Member’s Protection Act (ASPA).
This law, introduced in August 2002, limits U.S. military
aid and economic assistance to member countries of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague.
Exemptions are granted to countries that sign Article
98 agreements, promising not to send U.S. citizens
to the ICC without U.S. agreement. Exemptions to
ASPA are granted to NATO and non-NATO allies, but
Argentina is the only country in Latin America to enjoy
that status.
The intention of the law was to protect U.S.
citizens, but the unintended consequence is to limit
U.S. security cooperation with the region. A dozen
Latin American countries lost some U.S. military and
economic assistance due to this act.92 In some cases,
China and Venezuela have moved to fill the void left
by U.S. assistance.93 The U.S. Government, concerned
by Washington’s waning influence in Latin America
as well as the current shift to leftist governments
in many of the region’s capitals, signed a waiver on
October 2, 2006, that delinked International Military
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Education and Training (IMET) from ICC and Article
98 status. Nonetheless, restrictions to certain military
and economic assistance still apply.
China’s increased involvement in Latin America is
part of its long-term grand strategy. This grand strategy
focuses on “comprehensive national power” necessary
to achieve the status of a “global great power that is
second to none” by 2049.94 It seeks energy security and
access to natural resources, raw materials, and overseas
markets to sustain its economic expansion. It pursues
military power and aims to build a network of Beijing’s
friends and allies through China’s “soft power” and
diplomatic charm offensive, trade, and economic
dependencies via closer economic integration and
mutual security pacts, intelligence cooperation, and
arms sales.95
According to Sergio Cesarin, a well-known
Argentine China scholar, when looking at China’s
role in Latin America, one should consider China’s
aspiration to increase its influence in the international
system through the construction of political, economic,
and military power. The Chinese have a tradition of
long-term vision. They are working on a gradual
and progressive insertion in the region, which is a
reflection of their slow, unfolding potential in the
world. Their approach is subtle, and they generally
keep a low profile in the region. (Chinese President Hu
Jintao’s 2004 tour was an exception.) China is seen as
an opportunity for Latin America to break the existing
North-South asymmetry.96
Forging friendships with other developing
countries is an important aspect of China’s efforts to
become a great power. According to Professor Jiang
Shixue of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
China, as a developing country, always considers
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its relations with other developing countries as the
foundation of its foreign policies. Shixue explains that
as a promoter and supporter of cooperation among
developing countries, China adheres to the principle
of pursuing equality, mutual benefits, effectiveness,
and common development. Moreover, China’s current
stance toward international relations is based on four
principles that sit well with other developing countries:
autonomy, full equality, mutual respect, and mutual
noninterference.97
Latin American countries, like China, are
developing nations that also covet the principle of
nonintervention and believe in the protection of
sovereignty. China embraces a “strong” or “black
box” conception of state sovereignty, which holds
that a state’s internal affairs and domestic political
order are only rarely and in limited ways a legitimate
concern of the international community, and almost
never warrant military action by foreign powers.
This emphasis on sovereignty has long been a central
theme of China’s foreign relations.98 Latin American
countries also covet sovereignty and have historically
promoted the principle of nonintervention, which they
regard as protection from foreign interference. Indeed,
the Doctrine of Non-Intervention continues to be one
of the most fundamental pillars of the Inter-American
system. Article 19 of the Organization of American
States (OAS) Charter states:
No state or group of states has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in
the internal or external affairs of any other state. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but
also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the state or against its political,
economic, and cultural elements.99
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Beijing’s customary denials notwithstanding, “the
successful Chinese model” of “development minus
democracy” or “development before democracy” is
being sold to the developing world as an alternative
model for ending poverty. Dr. Evan Ellis believes
that for Latin America, China provides a compelling
illustration that an underdeveloped country can
achieve rapid economic growth and prosperity without
liberalizing its political system. The sheer magnitude
of the Chinese success story, coupled with Chinese
economic and diplomatic overtures to Latin America,
provides a compelling argument to those in the region
who wish to resist the U.S. agenda of democracy,
free trade, and economic reform. This influence, even
more than actual Chinese investment and political and
military support, may “tip the scales” in helping to
strengthen anti-U.S., anti-democratic, and an anti-free
market leaders in the region.100
Over the years, China has been pursuing increased
political cooperation with the Latin American region.
China has participated in political dialogues with
the Rio Group since 1990,101 and in June 1994, China
became the first Asian country to be an observer of the
Latin American Integration Association.102 China was
admitted into the Caribbean Development Bank in 1997,
and in March 2007 China signed a memorandum of
understanding with the Inter-American Development
Bank that provides a framework for its possible
admission as a member of the Bank. China also has
participated in official talks with Mercosur.103
Rivalry with Taiwan and an interest in strengthening its vote in the UN also have inspired China’s wooing of Latin American countries. Out of the 26 nations
that still have “diplomatic relations” with Taiwan, 12 of
them are found in Central America and the Caribbean.
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Luring these 12 countries toward the “one China”
policy remains a key objective of Beijing’s foreign
policy. Most South American countries, including
Argentina, do not have official diplomatic relations
with Taiwan. Taiwan’s Buenos Aires Embassy closed
when Argentina recognized the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) in 1972. Since then, its interests have
been represented through a commercial office. Beyond
the Taiwan question, the Chinese also believe that
their relations with Latin American states will lead to
similar positions towards other international issues. In
a UN system where one country enjoys one vote, China
could win the support from Latin American countries
on some key issues.104
The U.S. Tarnished Image.
U.S. influence is damaged by a tarnished image
throughout the Latin American region. Nowhere in the
region is U.S. popularity as low as it is in Argentina. The
United States and its Washington Consensus policies
of the 1990s have been largely blamed by the media
and subsequent government administrations for the
2001-02 economic melt-down in the country.
As a result, Argentina has worked to obstruct the
U.S. policy agenda for the region. Along with fellow
Mercosur countries, Argentina helped derail the U.S.led Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) talks at
the Summit of the Americas it hosted in November
2005. During the official summit, the Argentine
government supported an anti-U.S and anti-free trade
countersummit dominated by the “anti-imperialist”
diatribes of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.
Recently, in March 2007, the Argentine government
also permitted an anti-Bush rally led by Hugo Chavez
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in Buenos Aires as President George Bush visited
neighboring Uruguay as part of a multicountry Latin
American tour. The IMF, with its practice of “tough
love” during Argentina’s economic crisis, bore the
brunt of Argentina’s frustration with U.S.-led policies.
In early 2006, Argentina—following Brazil—paid off
its debt to the IMF using Venezuelan money, freeing
itself from loan conditions that it considered violations
of its national sovereignty.
The Argentine government’s anti-American stance
reflects its electorates’ sentiments. According to the
2005 report of Latinobarómetro, an annual public
opinion survey for Latin America, Argentina is the
Latin American country which has the “least positive”
image of the United States. While between 70 and 87
percent of Central Americans, for example, have a
“rather good” opinion of the United States, only 32
percent of Argentines are reported to have a good
opinion of the country.
While the United States is associated with failed
economic policies of the 1990s, China is praised for
contributing to several years of export-led growth
in Argentina and other South American countries.
Not surprisingly then, Argentina views China as an
alternative to U.S. hegemony. As it disassociates from
the United States, Argentina pushes for increased ties
to China and other growing global economies. It prefers
China’s seemingly less intrusive approach to business
and politics. The United States insists on meddling
in issues of human rights, free-trade, and democracy
in Argentina and other Latin American countries,
while China to date eschews interference in domestic
political concerns. Argentina and other Latin American
countries, valuing the principle of sovereignty above
all else, have reacted favorably to China’s hands-off
approach.
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China has received positive reviews from Argentines and Latin American citizens as a whole in recent
opinion polls. According to a February 2006 Opinion
Analysis Report of the U.S. State Department, a December
2005 poll reveals that 57 percent of Argentines hold a
favorable image of China (even though the same poll
shows that Argentines are not very informed about
China105). According to the State Department report,
Argentine opinion toward China is part of a broader
regional phenomenon as Latin American citizens
consider the Asian power an alternative to the U.S. and
European markets.106
The Argentines are embracing China’s rise in the
cultural and academic realms as well. The University
of Buenos Aires in Argentina, for example, started a
Chinese-language department in 2004 after Hu Jintao’s
visit. Instead of the 20 students expected, more than
600 signed up for classes. Now there are more than
1,000 students studying Chinese at the university in
nearly 70 classes.107 There also has been an increase in
academic and educational exchanges between the two
countries, with some universities creating programs for
Chinese students to study Spanish and other courses
in Argentina. The rector of a private Jesuit university
in Buenos Aires has visited China frequently in 2006
to establish an exchange program for the Chinese
revolving around the study of Jorge Luis Borges, the
famous Argentine writer. According to a source close to
the rector, the Chinese are crazy for Borges. Moreover,
in an unprecedented academic seminar on September
11, 2006, Chinese and Argentine scholars participated
in a forum discussing issues related to their “shared”
economic development experiences. At the day-long
event organized by the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) and the Latin American Council
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of Social Sciences (known by its Spanish acronym
CLACSO), a Cooperation Framework Agreement
was signed between the two organizations promising
future collaboration.
Policy Recommendations and Conclusion.
The United States has a series of factors working
against it in Latin America that make it especially vulnerable in the telecommunications and space sectors.
First, U.S. companies no longer dominate foreign
telecommunications and space industries. There is
increased competition internationally—especially from
China, which is now targeting developing markets
for both economic and strategic reasons. Chinese
telecommunications companies like Huawei and ZTE
enjoy generous government credits, buffering them
from short-term loss in these less profitable markets.
Moreover, the Chinese government is offering the
Argentine government satellite services way below
international market prices. Second, China is actively
seeking superiority in information technology
capabilities. Its increasing pool of talented cheap labor
in this industry is likely to perpetuate China’s success
in this area. More disconcertingly, Chinese military
strategy emphasizes the use of IW as a means to
overcome asymmetric warfare with the United States.
The Chinese are long-term strategists, and one should
not discount the possibility that they are working to gain
a strategic foothold in telecommunications industries
around the world for strategic and military interests as
much economic ones. Third, Chinese influence is rising
in the Latin American region as a whole, which could
eventually give it more sway over local governments
that ultimately control in-country information systems
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and networks. U.S. popularity is low in the region,
and China’s is growing. Argentina now feels more
comfortable allying itself with Venezuela and doing
business with the Chinese than cooperating with the
United States.
While China is not currently building a significant
military presence in Latin America, the human and commercial infrastructure that it is building increasingly
gives China a powerful lever for disrupting and
distracting the United States in the Western Hemisphere
should Sino-U.S. relations turn sour in the future.108 The
United States should work to counter China’s growing
influence in the region in order to mitigate future
threats. To do so requires improving U.S. relations with
Latin American countries and making U.S. companies
more competitive in the region—especially in strategic
markets where U.S. security is at stake.
The most effective way for the United States to
improve its standing and influence in Argentina, and
the Latin American region as a whole, is to help these
countries succeed economically through increased
aid, trade, and investments. The United States has
neglected the region as it pursues other foreign policy
objectives in the Middle East. Besides Plan Colombia
and counternarcotics and terrorism programs in the
Central American and Andean subregions, other
economic and humanitarian assistance programs
have been reduced over the last several years due to
budget constraints largely associated with the war in
Iraq. The United States has left a void in the region.
Venezuela, rich with petro-dollars, and China, rich
in foreign exchange after decades of unprecedented
economic growth, are trying to fill it. So far, they have
been succeeding.
Peter DeShazo, Director of the Americas Program
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
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(CSIS), testified before the Congress House Arms
Service Committee about the need to assist the region
with what he termed “second generation structural reforms” to help with job creation and poverty reduction
by providing more economic assistance and flexibility
to policymakers in the region. DeShazo emphasized,
“We have to be seen as a country really concerned
about poverty to help people in the hemisphere to
improve their lives.” We need to greatly improve
public diplomacy in the hemisphere. Cuts in assistance
to the region put us at a disadvantage.”109
One of the issues for Southern Cone countries is
that they fall in the middle-income bracket, which
means they do not qualify for U.S. economic assistance
through U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) programs. Measuring U.S. assistance based
on per capita income, however, is a mistake, and
leaves many deserving friendly nations without
U.S. assistance. Per capita income does not take into
consideration pervasive income inequalities that affect
the region. Argentina, according to 2005 World Bank
figures, has a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita
of USD $4,470 which qualifies it as a middle-income
economy. Yet 34 percent of its population lives under
the poverty line, with 12 percent living in extreme
poverty. The poverty figure reached 57 percent in
2002 during the country’s Depression-level economic
crisis.110 The United States did not offer any economic
assistance then to Argentina and does not offer any
now. Failure to assist Argentina during its devastating
economic crisis in 2002 damaged bilateral relations and
tarnished the U.S. image. Argentina has since allied
itself closely with Venezuela and increased bilateral
engagement with China.
The United States should look to provide economic
assistance regardless of qualification requirements
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devised in a by-gone era. Jay Cope, Director of the
Western Hemisphere Program at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense
University in Washington, DC, argues that many aid
qualification requirements were developed in the Cold
War era when the regional strategic environment was
different and when, in some countries, poverty levels
were lower. Cope explains that we are in a different
era and a new environment, and the U.S. Government
should adapt its policies to the new security realities.
He believes that now, more than ever before, we need
to be clever in our endeavors to help Latin American
countries succeed. U.S. popularity is low, and regional
governments are particularly sensitive to any actions
or behaviors that can be interpreted as paternalistic
and arrogant. The United States does not—nor can
it—play Santa Claus in Latin America. Nor do the
countries in the region need it to play this role. Many
regional governments are sophisticated and have much
to contribute, and they also have more partnership
options. They no longer depend solely on assistance
from the United States. According to Cope, the United
States can best assist these countries by supporting
their development efforts. He concludes, “Let them
take the lead, and we will support them.”111
The U.S. Government should also expand creative,
cost-effective forms of development assistance. In a
time of war, this may be the only means up ramping
up our aid efforts. One cost-effective way to improve
bilateral relations through development assistance
is to strengthen technical cooperation programs.
These programs can be catered to the strategic
telecommunications and space industries. When
done well, they foment knowledge-sharing, economic
development, and mutual understanding. Argentina
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participates in scientific-technological cooperation
with Germany and France and more project-oriented
technical cooperation with Japan, Germany, Italy,
and Spain.112 The United States does not participate in
technical cooperation programs with Argentina, as they
tend to be run through USAID which does not have a
presence in Argentina for reasons stated above.
The U.S. Government could boost technical
cooperation in Argentina and other middle-income
countries that do not qualify for USAID assistance by
supporting the programs of the U.S. Trade Development
Agency (USTDA). USTDA’s mission is to advance
economic development and U.S. commercial interests in
developing and middle-income countries. To this end,
the agency funds various forms of technical assistance,
investment analysis, training, orientation visits, and
business workshops that support the development of
a modern infrastructure and a fair and open trading
environment.113 The agency could focus its efforts
more on the strategic sectors like telecommunications
and space in Argentina and other countries where
it behooves the United States to have a presence for
reasons related to national security. In February 2007,
USTDA held a conference in San Francisco, California,
with African officials to discuss communications and
technology needs in Africa. More than USD $2 billion
in business and procurement opportunities was
presented at the event.114 It could be advantageous to
hold a similar event for Latin American countries to
promote U.S. investment in the region.
According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Stephen Johnson, China does not currently pose a
direct military threat in Latin America and has steadily
embraced market concepts, but it represents serious
competition that could dilute U.S. influence in the
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region. This could have serious security implications
for the United States in the medium to long term. The
Chinese are long-term planners, and their presence
in less profitable, strategic sectors should serve as a
warning to the U.S. Government. The time to act is now
while China’s presence is still at a nascent phase. The
United States should begin to encourage U.S. company
presence in strategic industries like telecommunications and space. The current lack of involvement in the
telecommunications sector in Argentina is leaving the
United States vulnerable. More importantly, Argentina
is just one of many countries where U.S. companies
have withdrawn from this strategic sector.
China’s state-sponsored companies have an
advantage in developing world countries. With cheaper
products, generous lines of credit and mandates to
stick it out for the long term, they will eventually
beat out more profit-driven U.S. companies. The U.S.
Government must step up its promotion of doing
business in developing countries, especially in strategic
industries. This requires increased funding for the U.S.
Commercial Service to ensure they have the resources
and personnel necessary for detailed market research,
targeted communications of business opportunities
to U.S. companies, and promotion of U.S. companies
abroad. The U.S. Government also needs to step in and
provide incentives to U.S. companies to maintain a
presence in developing countries’ telecommunications
and space sectors despite low-profit margins in the
short term. The U.S. Government could devise a
cost-sharing scheme where it funds a portion of U.S.
companies’ investment in less-profitable yet highly
strategic industries. Essentially it would help cushion
these companies from economic instability and shortterm loss as they establish themselves in the more
volatile developing economies.
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The U.S. Government should continue to push for
free trade throughout the region, but it should do so
in a more generous way. Free trade agreements have
been the hallmark of U.S. policy toward Latin America
since the 1990s and are an effective mechanism for
increased cooperation and economic development.
In order to succeed in the creation of the FTAA, the
United States should drop its agricultural and steel
subsidies that dissuade potential South American
partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved U.S.
trade relations will open market access for both U.S.
and South American enterprises and provide an
outlet for industrial growth.115 Failure to reach a trade
agreement will further alienate friendly nations in
South America—namely Brazil and Argentina. These
countries will then most likely continue to strengthen
ties with alternative trading partners like China.
The United States Government should also work
toward maintaining good relations with regional militaries. On the whole, the United States remains popular
amongst Latin American military leaders. Many grew
up with U.S. military doctrine and were groomed
through U.S. military training and exercises. Regional
militaries suffer from diminished budgets and have
grown to rely on U.S. military assistance for training
and the purchasing of equipment. ASPA has stifled the
free flow of U.S. assistance to friendly militaries, and,
as a result, they have looked for alternative assistance
from others, including China. It is imperative that the
United States lift military assistance restrictions before
good relations turn sour.
The United States would also benefit from
strengthening other forms of cooperation with regional
militaries. Bilateral working groups including crisis
simulation exercises organized by the Office of the
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Secretary of Defense (OSD) have been successful in
the past in Argentina and are worth repeating. They
provide an opportunity for U.S. Government officials
to get to know Argentine officials. They also provide
an opportunity for relationship building among
estranged Argentine civilian and military leaders.
Forums for dialogue between the U.S. and Argentine
military leadership revolving around Argentina’s
current efforts with modernization reform could also
serve to increase friendship. Moreover, continuing
with international educational exchanges is critical for
knowledge-sharing and friendship building. It is in the
U.S. security interest that regional militaries feel like
they can count on it for support and guidance when
requested.
The United States is now in competition in the
Latin American region. It cannot take for granted
that regional governments, militaries, or publics will
automatically approve of the United States or want to
work with it. The United States has to sell itself in the
region.116 To do so, it needs to work harder to assist
regional governments to succeed through aid, trade,
and investment. The United States also needs to refine
its public diplomacy, toning down residual arrogance
from a by-gone era. The Latin American countries now
have alternatives and have formed new partnerships.
U.S. business, assistance, and friendship are proving
less imperative for their success in today’s global
economy.
Consecutive years of double-digit economic growth
and huge dollar reserves are facilitating China’s
current wave of international expansion. The Chinese
are strategically beginning their expansion efforts in
the developing world where competition is leaner, its
cheaper products are in highest demand, and where
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its status as a developing country creates synergies.
As the Argentine case highlights, China’s growing
presence in strategic sectors in the developing world is
a concern for U.S. national security.
China achieved quick success in the Argentine
telecommunications market. The Chinese companies,
Huawei and ZTE, entered through the backdoor,
starting in rural markets with less competition and
working their way to the urban centers. In just a few
short years, both companies are making a profit in the
Argentine market and are supplying the country’s key
monopolies. And these large international monopolies
are now aligning themselves with the Chinese in the
marketplace.
As all of this transpires, U.S. companies are
withdrawing from Argentine—and other international—markets. They are forgoing opportunities in
growing developing markets to make a more secure
profit at home and in developed foreign economies.
This could have serious consequences for the United
States as international information systems become
more vulnerable and as they play a larger role in
security, defense, and warfare. China is a strategic rival
of the United States, and it is building its capabilities
in information technologies and IW. Its growing
presence in Western Hemisphere air and space should
be considered a warning. Just as India feared Huawei’s
involvement in its information networks, the United
States should be wary of China’s increased involvement
in Latin America’s information networks. With today’s
interdependent information systems, the United States
becomes more dependent on networks in foreign
countries controlled by foreign governments.
It is not too late for the U.S. Government to take
remedial action to increase its presence in Latin
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American telecommunications and space sectors.
Commercial efforts should be complemented by a
heavy dose of improved public diplomacy—especially
in countries similar to Argentina where U.S. popularity
is low and where China has made substantial inroads.
China’s expansion into and U.S. withdrawal from
Latin America’s strategic telecommunications and
space sectors require further examination and longterm strategic planning in order to protect U.S. national
security.
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